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Extraterritorial corporate liability for
environmental harm: 
Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell
JANE ROONEY*




On 14 February 2018 the Court of  Appeal confirmed in Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell1that English courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the matter of  whether the
parent company, Royal Dutch Shell (RDS), owed a duty of  care towards the people of  the
Ogale Community affected by the contamination of  waterways by oil spills, as a result of
deep-water oil exploration in the Niger Delta by its subsidiary, Shell Petroleum
Development Company of  Nigeria Ltd (SPDC). 
This case note considers how Okpabi establishes a curtailment of  the precedent set in
Lungowe v Vedanta2 for ensuring accountability of  home corporations in English courts.
Okpabi provides further evidence of  the ineffectiveness of  tort law to ensure that English
domiciled parent companies take measures to prevent against harm to the health, safety,
and environment of  communities affected by the extraterritorial operations of  their
subsidiaries. 
1 The facts
In Okpabi, the claimants alleged that RDS was negligent in failing to maintain the oil
pipeline operated by its subsidiary SPDC in the Niger Delta to acceptable standards and
failing to protect it from interference by third parties engaging in bunkering – the
unlawful siphoning-off  of  oil.3 The oil ‘contaminated the land, swamps, groundwater and
waterways’, and the water could not be used for ‘drinking, agricultural, washing or
recreational purposes’ affecting over 40,000 people.4 RDS argued that English courts
could not exercise jurisdiction because there was ‘no real issue’ to be tried between the
claimants and the parent company,5 and that the claimants were merely using proceedings
against the parent company as a device to exercise jurisdiction over SPDC.6 Therefore, in
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order to decide whether English courts had jurisdiction over the case, the court had to
determine whether there was an arguable case of  a duty of  care owed by RDS to the
claimants based upon the preliminary evidence.7
2 The judgment 
The court examined whether there was foreseeable damage, a relationship of  proximity,
and whether it was ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose a duty of  care to establish whether
there was jurisdiction over the parent company.8 While the court found the damage
foreseeable, the main focus of  the judgment was proximity. The court confirmed9 that
the test for proximity was Chandler v Cape,10 which concerned a parent company’s liability
for its subsidiary’s treatment of  its employees. In order for liability to arise, the parent
company must have taken ‘direct responsibility for devising a material health and safety
policy, the adequacy of  which is the subject of  the claim’ or ‘control . . . the operations
which give rise to the claim’.11
Lord Justice Simon acknowledged RDS’s mandatory health and safety standards and
policies,12 the imposed system of  mandatory design and engineering practices,13 the
imposed system of  supervision and oversight in implementing RDS’s standards,14 RDS’s
financial control over SPDC in relation to the allegations of  negligence,15 and
centralisation of  security matters.16 However, in the case of  RDS, the concern had been
‘to ensure that there were proper controls and not to exercise control’, thus falling short
of  the proximity requirement in Chandler to ‘control operations’.17 Further, a distinction
had to be made ‘between a parent company which controls, or shares control of, the
material operations of  a subsidiary, on the one hand, and a parent company which simply
issues mandatory policies as group-wide operating guidelines for its subsidiaries’.18 A
duty of  care would not arise as a result of  the parent company merely establishing health
and safety guidelines to which all subsidiaries had to conform. If  mandatory policies were
directed towards a particular subsidiary, then a duty of  care was more likely to arise.19
Despite the fact that RDS had specific concerns regarding SPDC in Nigeria, as evidenced
in its 2014 Sustainability Report,20 RDS did not take ‘direct responsibility’ for the
practices and failures of  SPDC.21 In response to the claimant’s argument that it was fair,
just and reasonable to require RDS to take reasonable care to mitigate foreseeable harm
created by SPDC – as it would not subvert or compromise the Nigerian statutory scheme
and RDS had made billions of  pounds of  profit from SPDC’s operations22 – Lord Justice
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Simons responded that he did not find these matters ‘persuasive’.23 The court therefore
declined jurisdiction on the grounds that there was no arguable case of  a duty of  care
owed by RDS to the claimants.
3 Case Analysis
3.1 CLARIFICATION OF LUNGOWE V VEDANTA
The decision provides clarification of  the precedent in Lungowe v Vedanta.24 That case was
significant for declining to stay proceedings on the basis of  forum non conveniens, a common
law doctrine which entails that courts can refuse to take jurisdiction over matters where
there is a more appropriate forum available to the parties. The court in Lungowe read
Article 4 of  the Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/201225 as precluding
English courts from declining what was a mandatory jurisdiction where the defendant was
a company domiciled in England and Wales.26 Sufficient proximity was established
between the parent company, Vedanta, and the claimants, local residents in Nchanga,
Zambia, whose waterways had been contaminated by harmful effluent discharged during
the mining operations carried out by Vedanta’s subsidiary company, Konkola Copper
Mines. A decisive factor contributing to a finding of  proximity was Vedanta’s governance
framework setting out mandatory health, safety and environmental policies and
standards.27 The Court of  Appeal in Okpabi claims to confirm the Chandler v Cape test.
However, it departs from that test by denying that issuing inadequate standards can give
rise to parent company liability, instead requiring active control over the subsidiary’s
actions.28 The judgment demonstrates that the level of  control required to secure
jurisdiction over the parent company is a high threshold and cannot depend merely on
health and safety guidelines directed at the overall group of  subsidiaries. 
3.2 SHORTCOMINGS OF TORT LAW AS A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Okpabi provides evidence of  the inability of  tort law to ensure English domiciled parent
companies take measures to prevent against harm to the health, safety and environment
of  communities affected by the extraterritorial operations of  their subsidiaries. The case
demonstrates that parent corporations are more likely to be liable in tort the more they
attempt to alleviate environmental harm, thus encouraging corporations to desist from
exercising due diligence in relation to the operation of  their subsidiaries. This is contrary
to the due diligence requirement of  corporations to take measures to avoid infringements
of  human rights enshrined in the non-binding, but authoritative, UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OCED) and Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.29 Further, a tort law
framework means that the larger the scale of  atrocity committed by the subsidiary, the less
likely the claimants will have access to English courts. In order for a duty of  care to arise
in tort, the defendant’s actions must result in losses to claimants ‘of  a kind in respect of
which damages are recoverable’.30 Lord Justice Simon found that the claimants who
owned land in the vicinity of  the pipeline which was damaged from the oil spill was not
a sufficiently defined group of  people affected for the purposes of  establishing a duty of
care. He stated it was important to distinguish between a ‘duty owed to a particular person
or class of  persons’ from ‘abstract concepts of  moral responsibility’, including to reduce
global warming and protect the environment.31 Further, a parent company is more likely
to be held liable in tort if  only one of  its subsidiaries causes particular concern, rather
than all of  its subsidiaries or a significant number of  them, as a result of  the ‘fair, just,
and reasonable’ requirement that the damage be recoverable. The more widespread and
systemic the harm to peoples’ health and environment, the less likely the court will have
jurisdiction to hear a case. 
Denial of  jurisdiction in the home state of  the parent company in practice means that
access to justice is denied to victims of  the subsidiary’s harmful activities. Structural
problems including ‘a weak rule of  law, corruption, lack of  independence of  the courts
and corporate capture’ mean that victims cannot access justice in the state hosting the
subsidiary corporation and where the harmful activity takes place.32 The duty of  care test
applied in Okpabi effectively gives rise to corporate immunity as a result. 
3.3 AN ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?
Whether an emphasis on the international human rights law framework could improve
regulation and accountability of  extraterritorial corporate environmental harm is
contested. Unlike non-state actors – such as corporations, insurgents and international
organisations – states have legally binding international human rights obligations: they are
duty bearers of  human rights when they become signatories to international human rights
treaties and incur binding international legal obligations towards the right bearers. While
the UN Guiding Principles and OECD Guidelines use the language of  human rights to
denote the harm committed by corporations, under international law ‘non-state actors . . .
do not violate the relevant human right—it was never their obligation to secure or ensure
it’.33 The UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
which is incorporated in domestic law through the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The
UK Parliament requires courts to ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of  the European
Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) when determining whether the state has committed a
violation of  its obligations under the HRA 1998.34
While the ECtHR recognises that states have negative obligations to not interfere with
the rights of  inhabitants on their territory, it also imposes certain positive obligations on
the state to ensure that third-party, non-state actors are prevented from committing
harms against individuals. This includes an obligation to ensure that domestic law,
regulating the relationship between private actors, prevents private actors from
committing certain harms against individuals. In Wilson v UK,35 the applicants alleged
violations of  their right to freedom of  expression and assembly36 when their employer
corporation offered them financial incentives to renounce their right to engage in
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collective bargaining with their trade union. This was not illegal under the UK Act of
Parliament, the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which
regulated work relations between employees and employers. However, the ECtHR ruled
that the UK had a responsibility ‘to secure to the applicants under domestic law the rights
set forth in article 11 of  the Convention’.37 A violation arose as a result of  the lack of
prohibition in domestic law for corporations to take measures to incentivise employees to
forfeit trade union participation. The UK has positive obligations under the HRA 1998
to ensure that its domestic legal frameworks prevent corporations from committing harm
contrary to human rights standards expected in a member state of  the ECHR.
States are required to take reasonable measures to prevent corporations committing
environmental harm in their own territories.38 For example, in Tatar v Romania,39 a
violation of  the ECHR arose as a result of  a cyanide spill in a goldmine owned and
operated by a private corporation: 100,000 cubic metres of  contaminated water were
released into rivers crossing Romania, Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria. The applicants
claimed that the operation of  the mine entailed serious risks to human life and health,
infringing upon their right to respect for private and family life.40 The state was found to
have failed in its positive duties to carry out effective regulation of  the activities of  the
mining corporation and in its rejection of  several administrative and criminal complaints
made by the claimants. The state failed to provide proper avenues for compensation and
criminal complaints.41 This demonstrates that there is the potential to hold member states
accountable for failing to prevent corporate environmental harm.
The ECtHR is yet to impose positive obligations to prevent extraterritorial corporate
environmental harm. In order for the ECHR to be applicable extraterritorially, the state
must exercise either ‘effective control over the territory’ or ‘state agent authority and
control’.42 Therefore, the ECtHR’s approach to the extraterritorial application of  human
rights is of  ‘limited value to the business and human rights domain because it is premised
on the physical presence of  State agents outside the State’s territory’.43
However, there is an increasing international trend towards imposing positive
obligations on the state to prevent extraterritorial corporate environmental harm.44 This
is relevant to the ECtHR because it uses international law standards to ensure evolutive
treaty interpretation that keeps up to date with contemporary attitudes about what should
be the scope of  human rights protection.45 On 7 February 2018, the Inter-American
Court of  Human Rights (IACtHR) issued an advisory opinion on whether states had
obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) in relation to
extraterritorial environmental damage in the Wider Caribbean Region, carried out by
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corporations situated in their territories.46 This was a case concerning transboundary
environmental harm, meaning that a corporation situated within the territory of  the
member state was committing environmental harm against individuals situated in a
different territory. However, the principles on the extraterritorial application of  the
ACHR were quite expansive. It stated that:
The activities undertaken in the jurisdiction of  one State party shall not deprive
other States of  their capacity to ensure that persons under their jurisdiction enjoy
their rights under the Convention . . . it is understood that the person whose
rights have been breached fall within the jurisdiction of  the State of  origin if
there is a causal link between the facts occurring in its territory and the violation
of  the human rights of  person outside its territory.
It is the State in whose territory or in whose jurisdiction these activities are
undertaken, who has effective control over them and is in a position to prevent
the causation of  transboundary damage that may affect the enjoyment of  human
rights of  individuals outside its territory. The potential victims of  the negative
consequences of  these activities should be deemed to be within the jurisdiction
of  state of  origin for the purposes of  any potential state responsibilities for
failure to prevent transboundary damage.47
This advisory opinion is progressive insofar as it requires a ‘causal link between the facts
occurring’ in the respondent state and the violation of  the human right in a different
territory rather than requiring the state’s presence in the extraterritorial territory. The
‘facts occurring’ is quite a broad criterion and could include, arguably, a domestic
regulatory framework that fails to hold home state corporations accountable for the
activities of  their subsidiaries, but this is not stated explicitly and the case concerns
transboundary activity. The test limits itself  to only protecting individuals in
extraterritorial territories that are also member states of  the ACHR, rather than territories
outside of  the Inter-American system. If  this test was adopted by the ECtHR, the UK
could not be held accountable for human rights abuses happening in the Niger Delta. 
Conclusion
Enforceable human rights obligations appear to have the potential to hold states
accountable for extraterritorial corporate environmental harm, including for failing to
provide an adequate regulatory framework that disincentivises corporations to be
negligent in relation to their extraterritorial activities. On assessment of  the Okpabi case,
human rights could impose an obligation on the state to produce a legislative framework
regulating private actor behaviour that is in conformity with human rights standards.
While international human rights law has not quite reached the point of  imposing
enforceable international obligations on states, one could speculate, considering the
direction of  international human rights litigation, that it may become a reality in the
foreseeable future. 
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